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Decentralization of decision-making is among the most intriguing recent school reforms, in part because
countries went in opposite directions over the past decade and because prior evidence is inconclusive.
We suggest that autonomy may be conducive to student achievement in well-developed systems but
detrimental in low-performing systems. We construct a panel dataset from the four waves of international
PISA tests spanning 2000-2009, comprising over one million students in 42 countries. Relying on
panel estimation with country fixed effects, we identify the effect of school autonomy from within-country
changes in the average share of schools with autonomy over key elements of school operations. Our
results show that autonomy affects student achievement negatively in developing and low-performing
countries, but positively in developed and high-performing countries. These results are unaffected
by a wide variety of robustness and specification tests, providing confidence in the need for nuanced
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1.  Introduction 
Virtually every country in the world accepts the importance of human capital investment as 
an element of economic development, but this has introduced a set of important policy questions 
about how best to pursue such investments.  Over time, attention has shifted away from simply 
ensuring  access  to  schooling  to  an  interest  in  the  quality  of  learning.
1  But  this  shift  has 
introduced new policy uncertainty since the process of expanding school attainment is better 
understood than is the process of improving achievement, leaving many countries with limited 
success after adopting a variety of popular policies.  The uncertainty has perhaps been largest in 
the case of institutional design questions, as the evidence in that area has been thinner and less 
reliable.  This paper focuses on one popular institutional change – altering the degree of local 
school autonomy in decision-making – and brings a new analytical approach to the analysis of its 
impact.
2  By  introducing  cross-country  panel  analysis,  we  can  exploit  the  substantial 
international variation in policy initiatives focused on autonomy.  We find that autonomy does 
significantly affect the performance of a country’s schools, but the impact is quite heterogeneous 
across stages of development:  The effect of school autonomy in decision-making is positive in 
developed countries, but in fact turns negative in developing countries.  
Local autonomy has been a policy discussed intensively in both developing and developed 
countries.  While many countries have moved toward more decentralization in such areas as the 
hiring  of  teachers  or  the  choice  of  curricular  elements,  others  have  actually  gone  to  more 
centralized  decision-making.    The  opposing  movements  reflect  a  fundamental  tension.    The 
prime argument favoring decentralization is that local decision-makers have better understanding 
of the capacity of their schools and the demands that are placed on them by varying student 
populations.  This knowledge in turn permits them to make better resource decisions, to improve 
the productivity of the schools, and to meet the varying demands of their local constituents.  Yet, 
                                                 
1  Hanushek  and  Woessmann  (2008)  show  that  cognitive  skills  can  have  substantial  impacts  on  economic 
development.  At the same time, access and attainment goals dominate many policy discussions.  The clearest 
statement of school attainment goals can be found in discussions of the Education for All Initiative of the World 
Bank and UNESCO (see the description in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_For_All, accessed July 31, 2011) 
and the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations (see the description in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Millennium_Development_Goals, accessed July 31, 2011).  In both instances, while there is some discussion of 
quality issues, the main objective has been seen as providing all children with at least a lower secondary education.   
2 Local autonomy for decision-making is referred to in various ways including decentralized decision-making 
and site-based or school-based management.  Here, we typically use the term local or school autonomy, although we 
think of it as a synonym for these alternative names.   2 
countervailing  arguments,  centered  on  lack  of  decision-making  capacity  and  conflicting 
incentives,  push  in  the  opposite  direction.    With  local  autonomy  comes  the  possibility  that 
individual schools pursue goals other than achievement maximization and a potential threat to 
maintaining common standards across the nation.   
Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos (2011) provide a thoughtful review of the topic in developing 
countries, focusing on several evaluations of recent decentralization programs, mostly conducted 
by the World Bank.  Their review highlights how methodological approaches – including the use 
of random control trials, various instrumental-variable applications, and more standard cross-
sectional evaluations – influence the program evaluations.
3  Similarly, reviews of the experiences 
of the U.S. tend to find mixed results (Summers and Johnson (1996)).
4  Despite mixed evidence, 
there remains considerable policy support for further local autonomy in decision-making (e.g., 
Ouchi (2003); World Bank (2004); Governor’s Committee on Educational Excellence (2007)).
5 
From an analytical viewpoint, four significant issues arise.  First, the very concept of local 
decision-making and local autonomy is multifaceted and difficult to measure on a consistent 
basis.  It is possible, for example, for local schools to decide some things – such as teacher hiring 
or facility upgrades – and not others such as the appropriate outcome standards or the pay of 
teachers.  Conceptually, some decisions are more appropriately made locally – e.g., operational 
decisions like hiring and budget allocations where local knowledge is needed and standardization 
is not crucial – than others where standardization may be more desirable – e.g., course offerings 
and requirements (see Bishop and Woessmann (2004)).  
Second, the impact of autonomy may well vary with other elements of the system.  For 
example, local autonomy permits using localized knowledge to improve performance, but it also 
opens up the possibility for more opportunistic behavior on the part of local school personnel.  
As a result, the impact on student outcomes may well interact with the level of accountability, 
because centralized accountability provides a way of monitoring local behavior  (Woessmann 
                                                 
3 For studies of autonomy in developing countries, see also, e.g., Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2008) and 
the references therein, Behrman and King (2001), Jimenez and Sawada (1999), and Vegas (1999).  
4 For further evidence from developed countries, see, e.g., Barankay and Lockwood (2007) and Clark (2009).  
5 In analyzing governance aspects at the level of tertiary education, Aghion et al. (2010) show that autonomy is 
positively related to universities’ research output in the U.S. and in Europe and argue for benefits from combining 
autonomy with accountability.    3 
(2005)).
6  In  a  larger  sense,  the  results  of  autonomy  may  depend  on  the  performance  level 
(Mourshed, Chijioke, and Barber (2010)) and – as a corollary – on the overall development level 
of the country and the entire school system.  
Third, much of the evidence on autonomy comes from cross-sectional analyses where any 
effects  are  not  well  identified.
7  Specifically,  one  must  often  question  whether  observable 
characteristics  adequately  describe  differences  in  schools  that  are  and  are  not  granted  more 
autonomy in decision-making.  For example, if more dynamic schools get greater autonomy or if 
demanding parents choose autonomous schools, it is difficult to extract the independent effect of 
local decision-making on student achievement.  
Fourth, many aspects of the locus of decision-making are set at the national level.  For 
example,  many  countries  set  national  educational  standards,  national  assessments  and 
accountability regimes, and various rules about what decisions are permissible at the local level, 
leaving  little  to  no  within-country  variation  in  decision-making  authority.  Relatedly,  any 
general-equilibrium effects are extremely difficult to disentangle if, for example, the pattern of 
local decision-making brings a competitive response from schools without local decision-making 
or if the nature of local decisions alters the supply of teachers or administrators.  But dealing 
with these issues through international comparisons – where institutional variation can be found 
– brings other identification issues related to variations in culture, governmental institutions, and 
other things that are difficult to measure. 
This paper introduces new international panel data to address each of these issues.  We 
develop  a  panel  of  international  test  results  from  the  Programme  for  International  Student 
Assessment (PISA), covering 42 countries and four waves that span a time period of ten years.
8  
While we estimate our micro models with over one million student observations to account for 
                                                 
6 Such considerations have also entered into the interpretation of mixed results from autonomy in the U.S. (see 
Hanushek (1994); Loeb and Strunk (2007)).  A further U.S. example comes from charter schools, which depend 
significantly on the regulatory environment they face.  Charter schools are publicly financed and regulated schools 
that are allowed to have considerable autonomy, frequently being stand-alone schools.  At least a portion of the 
variation in the evaluations of charter schools probably reflects interactions with other forces such as degree of 
parental choice, the quality of information, and constraints on school location.  For estimates of the variation in 
charter outcomes, see CREDO (2009), Hanushek et al. (2007), Booker et al. (2007), and Bifulco and Ladd (2006). 
7 Note that more recent investigations, particularly in developing countries, have relied on randomized control 
trials – although these are difficult to implement and a number have not been well executed (Bruns, Filmer, and 
Patrinos (2011)). 
8 For a discussion of international assessments along with background material for this analysis, see Hanushek 
and Woessmann (2011).   4 
family and school inputs at the individual level, the panel character of the analysis is at the 
country level.  The survey information that accompanies the student assessments provides rich 
detail about individual students and schools along with specific descriptions of the decisions that 
are and are not permissible at the school level.  While a variety of studies have looked at some of 
these institutional features across countries, all prior work has been purely cross-sectional (see 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2011)).
9  We identify autonomy effects by exploiting country-level 
variation over time after including country (and year) fixed effects that control for systematic, 
time-invariant  cultural  and  institutional  differences  at  the  country  level.
10  This  framework 
ensures that our estimates are not affected by within-country selection into autonomy and by 
unobserved  country-specific  heterogeneity.    Within  this  framework,  we  can  readily  test  the 
heterogeneous effects of autonomy by specific types of decisions; by variations in development 
levels and educational performance levels; and by the existence of centralized accountability.  
Our central finding is that local autonomy has an important impact on student achievement, 
but this impact varies systematically across countries, depending on the level of economic and 
educational development.  In simplest terms, countries with otherwise strong institutions gain 
considerably from decentralized decision-making in their schools, while countries that lack such 
a strong existing structure may actually be hurt by decentralizing decision-making.  The negative 
effect in developing countries emerges most clearly for autonomy in areas relating to academic 
content, but also appears for autonomy in the areas of personnel and budgets.  An extensive 
series of robustness and specification tests corroborate the central finding.  
We use the income level of a country (GDP per capita) as an indicator of overall skills and 
institutions.  Higher-income countries tend to have better societal and economic institutions that 
promote productivity, societal vision, and smooth social interactions.  As such, this indicator is 
broad and multifaceted, leading us  also  to  investigate more specific and nuanced aspects  of 
institutions.  We find indications that the development of the educational system (measured by 
higher achievement) adds another significant dimension to the success of greater local autonomy.  
Further, consistent with the underlying motivation for constraining opportunistic behavior, the 
benefits of greater autonomy are enhanced by accountability through centralized examinations. 
                                                 
9 For examples of existing investigations of institutions – and particularly of autonomy – across countries, see 
Woessmann (2003, 2005), Fuchs and Woessmann (2007), and Woessmann et al. (2009). 
10 An early discussion of the underlying concept can be found in Gustafsson (2006).   5 
At a methodological level, the results show the potential perils of cross-country analyses that 
cannot control for other institutional and development factors.  In our specific analysis, we find 
different and conflicting results between simple cross-sectional analysis (albeit with extensive 
controls of measured family and schooling inputs) and our new panel estimators.  Further, the 
heterogeneity of results across different levels of development suggests caution in attempting to 
generalize from developed-country analyses to developing countries (and vice versa). 
The next section discusses the underlying conceptual framework.  Section 3 describes the 
new database and key variation across countries in various kinds of local autonomy.  Section 4 
develops our empirical model.  Section 5 presents our estimation results and extensive robustness 
and  specification  tests.  Section  6  expands  the  investigation  of  interactions  to  centralized 
examinations and the performance level of the education system.  Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Conceptual Framework 
Substantial  research  has  gone  into  understanding  the  determinants  of  educational 
achievement.   This  work, generally under the label  of educational  production functions,  has 
incorporated a wide range of studies designed to understand how such factors as school resources 
and family background affect achievement.
11  Here we take an expanded view of this approach 
that highlights the importance of institutions and, in particular, of local autonomy. 
A typical formulation of an educational production function has student outcomes (T) as a 
function of family (F) and schools (S): 
(1)  ( , ) T f F S   
Here, however, we introduce the simple idea that the productivity of any input is directly related 
to the institutional structure of country c (Ic) that determines the basic environment and rules of 
schools, how decisions are made, the overall incentives in the system, and so forth: 
(2)    , c T I f F S   
For  many  analyses  of  educational  production  within  countries,  the  institutional  structure  is 
constant, and analyses that ignore it provide accurate information about the impacts of resources 
                                                 
11  See  Hanushek  (2002,  2003)  on  the  general  framework  and  U.S.  evidence;  see  Woessmann  (2003)  on 
international evidence.     6 
even if these might not transfer well to institutional structures in other countries.  In many ways, 
Ic is similar to total factor productivity in a macro context where it determines the efficiency with 
which any given set of inputs is translated into student achievement.  In this formulation, we are 
specifically interested in investigating the decision-making institutions of different countries. 
School autonomy or the decentralization of decision-making power can be understood as the 
delegation of a task by a principal (in this case, the government agency in charge of the school 
system), who wishes to facilitate the provision of knowledge, to agents, namely the schools (see 
Woessmann (2005)).  In the absence of divergent interests or asymmetric information, agents can 
be expected to behave in conformity with system objectives.  In fact, economic models of school 
governance  often  suggest  that  greater  autonomy  can  lead  to  increased  efficiency  of  public 
schools (e.g., Hoxby (1999); Nechyba (2003)), because autonomy offers the possibility of using 
superior local knowledge, with positive consequences for outcomes.  Additionally, by bringing 
decisions closer to the interested local community, decentralization may improve the monitoring 
of  teachers  and  schools  by  parents  and  local  communities  (see  Galiani,  Gertler,  and 
Schargrodsky (2008) and the references therein).  
However, when divergent interests and asymmetric information are present in a decision-
making area, agents have incentives and perhaps substantial opportunities to act in their own 
self-interest  with little  risk  that such behavior will be noticed and sanctioned.    In this  case, 
autonomy opens the scope for opportunistic behavior, with negative consequences for outcomes 
(Woessmann  (2005)).    Agents  may  use  their  greater  autonomy  to  further  goals  other  than 
advancing  student  achievement.    Furthermore,  the  quality  of  decision-making  may  also  be 
inferior at the local level when the technical capabilities of local decision-makers to provide 
high-quality services are limited and when local communities lack the ability to ensure high-
quality services (see Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2008)).  Consequently, the success of 
autonomy reforms may depend on the general level of human capital which affects the quality of 
parental monitoring.
12  
Against the background of these opposing sets of mechanisms of how autonomy affects 
performance, we argue that the impact of autonomy likely depends on the level of development.  
In general terms, a country’s development level captures such aspects as local capacity, abilities 
                                                 
12 While we focus on issues of decision-making, there may also be technological differences.  Centralization 
opens the possibility to exploit economies of scale, for example in evaluation, teacher training systems, and the like.   7 
of local decision-makers, governance effectiveness, state capacity, parental human capital, and 
monitoring abilities of local communities. Also specifically in the education system, systems that 
already work at a high performance level may have such features as external evaluations and 
well-trained  teachers  that  facilitate  local  decision-making  by  setting  and  ensuring  high 
educational standards.
13  In particular, accountability systems may limit the extent to which local 
decision-makers can act opportunistically without getting caught (Woessmann (2005)).  
In sum, there are a number of channels through which a higher level of development, both in 
the education system and in society more generally,  strengthens the positive mechanisms of 
autonomy  and  weakens  the  negative  ones.    The  impact  of  autonomy  on  performance  thus 
depends on the level of development, being positive in well-functioning systems but possibly 
even negative in dysfunctional systems.  
Finally,  the  impact  of  local  autonomy  may  differ  by  area  of  decision-making.    While 
standardization may be important in decisions on academic content, it may not be as important in 
decisions on process operations and personnel-management (Bishop and Woessmann (2004)).  
Thus, local decision-making over basic issues of standards such as course offerings or course 
content might have a negative effect of autonomy when the whole system is dysfunctional.  But 
even in such a system, local decision-making over hiring teachers and budget allocations may 
not be as negative. 
3.  International Panel Data 
An essential component of our analytical strategy is  the construction of a cross-country 
panel of student achievement data.  For this, we can take advantage of the recent expansion of 
international assessments (cf. Hanushek and Woessmann (2011)).  
3.1  Building a PISA Panel Database 
Our  empirical  analysis  relies  on  the  Programme  for  International  Student  Assessment 
(PISA), an internationally standardized assessment conducted by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD).  The PISA study, first conducted in 2000, is designed 
                                                 
13  For  example,  in  diagnosing  what  leads  to  improved  performance  at  different  stages  of  development, 
Mourshed, Chijioke, and Barber (2010) observe that going from ‘great to excellent’ is such that “the interventions of 
this stage move the locus of improvement from the center to the schools themselves” (p. 26).   8 
to obtain internationally comparable data on the educational achievement of 15-year-old students 
in math, science, and reading.   
Four distinct assessments have been carried out: in 2000/2002, 2003, 2006, and 2009.  In 
PISA 2000, 32 countries, including 28 OECD countries, participated in the assessment.  In 2002, 
a further 11 non-OECD countries administered the PISA 2000 assessment.  By PISA 2009, the 
latest assessment, the number of participating countries reached 65 countries including a range of 
emerging economies.  
PISA’s  target  population  is  the  15-year-old  students  in  each  country,  regardless  of  the 
institution  and  grade  they  currently  attend.    The  PISA  sampling  procedure  ensures  that  a 
representative sample of the target population is tested in each country.  Most countries employ a 
two-stage sampling technique.  The first stage draws a random sample of schools in which 15-
year-old students are enrolled, where the probability of a school to be selected is proportional to 
its size as measured by the estimated number of 15-year-old students attending.  The second 
stage randomly samples 35 students of the 15-year-old students in each of these schools, with 
each 15-year-old student having the same sampling probability.  
The performance tests are paper and pencil tests, lasting up to two hours for each student.  
The PISA tests are constructed to test a range of relevant skills and competencies.  Each subject 
is  tested  using  a  broad  sample  of  tasks  with  differing  levels  of  difficulty  to  represent  a 
comprehensive  indicator  of  the  continuum  of  students’  abilities.    The  performance  in  each 
domain is mapped on a scale with a mean of 500 test-score points and a standard deviation of 
100 test-score points across the OECD countries.
14  
In  addition  to  the  achievement  data,  PISA  also  provides  a  rich  array  of  background 
information  on  each  student  and  her  school.    Students  are  asked  to  provide  information  on 
personal characteristics and their family background.  School principals provide information on 
the schools’ resource endowment and institutional settings.  While some questionnaire items, 
such as the questions on student gender and age, remain the same in each assessment cycle, some 
information is not available or directly comparable across all PISA waves.  
                                                 
14 While the reading test has been psychometrically scaled on a uniform scale since 2000, the math test was re-
scaled in 2003 (and the science test in 2006) to have again mean 500 and standard deviation 100 across the OECD 
countries and has a common psychometric scale since then.  In our analyses below, year fixed effects take account 
of this.  Furthermore, we show that results are qualitatively the same when restricting the math analysis to the waves 
since 2003 that have a common psychometric scale.   9 
By merging the four PISA assessment cycles, we are, for the first time, able to construct a 
panel dataset at the country level.  In a first step, we combine students’ test scores in math, 
science,  and  reading  literacy  with  individual  students’  characteristics,  family  background 
information,  and school-level  data for each of the four  PISA waves.    Since the background 
questionnaires are not fully standardized, in a second step we select a set of core variables that 
are available in each of the four PISA waves and merge the cross-sectional data of 2000/2002, 
2003, 2006, and 2009 into one dataset.  
Our  sample  comprises  all  countries  that  participated  in  at  least  three  of  the  four  PISA 
waves.
15  Combining the available data, we construct a dataset containing 1,042,995 students in 
42 countries.  As is evident from Table 1, the panel includes a broad sample of both high-income 
and  lower-income  countries.    Following  the  World  Bank  classification,  25  countries  in  our 
sample are classified as high-income countries.  But there is also one low-income country, seven 
lower-middle-income countries, and nine upper-middle-income countries in the sample.  Figure 
1 depicts the available achievement data for the 42 countries in our sample.  The average test 
performance across all countries in the sample hardly changed between 2000 and 2009 (see also 
Table 1). But some countries saw substantial increases in average achievement (most notably 
Brazil,  Luxembourg,  Chile,  Portugal,  Mexico,  and  Germany  with  increases  surpassing  one 
quarter  of  a  standard  deviation),  while  others  saw  substantial  decreases  (mostly  notably  the 
United Kingdom and Japan with decreases surpassing one quarter of a standard deviation).  
To have a complete dataset of all students with performance data, we imputed country-by-
wave means for missing values of control variables.  Since we consider a large set of explanatory 
variables and since a portion of these variables is missing for some students, dropping all student 
observations with missing values would result in substantial sample reduction.  To ensure that 
imputed data are not driving our results, all our regressions include an indicator for each variable 
with missing data that equals one for imputed values and zero otherwise.  
We combine the student and school data with additional country-level data.  GDP per capita, 
measured in current US$, is provided by the World Bank and OECD national accounts data files.  
Data on annual expenditure per student in lower secondary education in 2000, 2003, and 2006 
are taken from the OECD Education at a Glance indicators (see Organisation for Economic Co-
                                                 
15  France  had  to  be  excluded  from  the  analysis  because  it  provides  no  information  on  the  school-level 
questionnaire.  Due to their small size, Liechtenstein and Macao were also dropped.    10 
operation and Development (2010)).  Data on the existence of curriculum-based external exit 
exams are an updated version of the data used by Bishop (2006).  
3.2  Measuring School Autonomy 
We  construct  our  measures  of  school  autonomy  for  each  country  from  the  background 
questionnaires of the four PISA studies.  In all waves, principals were asked to report the level of 
responsibility for different types of decisions regarding the management of their school.  We 
make use of six decision-making types: 1. Deciding which courses are offered; 2. Determining 
course  content;  3.  Choosing  which  textbooks  are  used;  4.  Selecting  teachers  for  hire;  5. 
Establishing teachers’ starting salaries; and 6. Deciding on budget allocations within the school.  
In 2000 and 2003, principals were asked, “In your school, who has the main responsibility 
for …”  For each of the enumerated areas, principals had to tick whether decisions were mainly a 
responsibility of the school’s governing board, the principal, department heads, or teachers as 
opposed to not being a responsibility of the school.  Similarly, in 2006 and 2009, principals were 
asked who has a considerable responsibility for the enumerated tasks and had to choose whether 
the  regional  or  national  education  authority  as  opposed  to  the  principal  or  teachers  had 
considerable responsibility.
16  In all four waves, respondents were explicitly allowed to tick as 
many options as appropriate in each area.  
For each area, we begin by constructing a variable indicating full autonomy at the school 
level, which equals one if a school entity – the principal, the school’s board, department heads, 
or teachers – is the only one to carry responsibility (and zero otherwise).  Thus, as soon as 
responsibility is also carried by external education authorities, we do not classify a school as 
autonomous.  (As part of the robustness checks below, for each area we also construct a variable 
indicating whether the school has any influence on the decision-making process as opposed to 
exercising full responsibility.)  Then, because our interest is focused on countries’ institutional 
structures, we aggregate across all schools in a country to obtain the share of schools with full 
autonomy in each of the areas.  As will be made explicit in the next section, we do not use the 
individual school measures of autonomy in the modeling of achievement because of concerns 
about introducing selection bias and because of the possibility of general-equilibrium effects.  
                                                 
16 See Table A2 in the appendix for an overview of the answer options and a discussion on their comparability 
across the PISA waves.   11 
Figure  2  shows  exemplary  graphs  across  the  four  waves  of  aggregate  autonomy  for 
determining courses offered and hiring in each country.  While many countries have rather flat 
profiles of autonomy over time, there are also  clear movements that differ between the two 
autonomy areas.  For example, among low-achieving countries, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have 
seen strong reductions in course autonomy, but smaller reductions (or even increases) in hiring 
autonomy.   Similarly,  among medium-achieving countries,  Greece, Portugal,  and to  a lesser 
extent Turkey have reduced course autonomy, but this is not the case for hiring autonomy in 
Portugal  and  Turkey.    At  a  higher  level  of  achievement,  Germany  has  increased  school 
autonomy, particularly in course offerings, whereas countries such as Great Britain, Australia, 
Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden have all seen slight decreases in the autonomy measures.  
Table 2 presents correlations among the six autonomy areas, both in their 2009 levels and in 
their difference between 2000 and 2009 (which provides the main source of identification in our 
analysis).  Obviously, the three autonomy areas on decisions that are related to academic content 
– namely courses offered, course content, and textbooks used – are highly correlated among each 
other, both in levels and in changes.  Also, the two autonomy areas on personnel decisions – 
hiring teachers and establishing their starting salaries – are strongly related.  As a consequence, 
we combine the three variables of courses offered, course content, and textbooks used into one 
category of autonomy regarding academic content by using their arithmetic mean.  Similarly, the 
mean  of  hiring  teachers  and  establishing  their  starting  salaries  represents  our  measure  of 
autonomy in personnel decisions.
17  Since autonomy on budget allocations is not correlated with 
any of the other autonomy areas (apart from the personnel areas when considered in differences 
rather than levels), we retain it as a separate third autonomy category.  
3.3  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents country-level means of the three autonomy measures, as well as mean PISA 
math scores, in 2000 and 2009.  Throughout the paper, our analysis focuses on mathematical 
literacy, which is generally viewed as being most readily comparable across countries; however, 
we also report main results in reading and science.  Table A1 in the appendix reports pooled 
international descriptive statistics for all variables employed in the analysis.  
                                                 
17 Results are very similar if, rather than using the mean across the autonomy categories, we use the share of 
schools in a country that have autonomy in two or three of the subcategories of the combined variables.  In the 
appendix, we also report results for the six separate autonomy categories.    12 
Table 1 also shows a country’s GDP per capita in 2000, our main measure of initial level of 
development.  Figure  3  plots  this  measure  of  initial  economic  development  against  initial 
educational achievement, measured as the PISA math score in 2000.  There is a strong relation 
between  the  initial  levels  of  economic  and  educational  development,  which  we  will  further 
explore below.  Most importantly, the figure visualizes where different countries stand on these 
measures of initial development, which is informative for our analysis of heterogeneity across 
initial country situations below.  
From Figure 1, we can assess the development of PISA math test scores across waves for all 
42 countries.  Among the low-performing countries with initial test scores below 400 points, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and moderately Tunisia managed to increase their test scores over time, 
whereas Argentina’s and Indonesia’s achievement is mostly flat.  Within the group of medium 
performers, Greece, Italy, Israel, Portugal, and Turkey show a slightly positive trend, whereas 
Thailand followed a slight downward trend.  Among the countries with initially relatively high 
scores, only Germany shows a consistent upward trend, whereas Great Britain and Japan, and to 
a  lesser  extent  Australia,  Austria,  Denmark,  Ireland,  New  Zealand,  and  Sweden,  show  a 
downward trend.  The other countries are mostly flat.  
Comparing these achievement trends to the autonomy trends seen in Figure 2, there are 
many  examples  where  the  combined  achievement  and  autonomy  trends  are  consistent  with 
increased autonomy, particularly over academic content, being bad in low-performing but good 
in high-performing countries.  For example, starting at a low level of achievement, the increasing 
achievement levels of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico are accompanied by reductions in autonomy of 
their schools in particular over course offerings.  Similarly, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey have 
reduced their course autonomy and slightly increased their achievement.  By contrast, Thailand – 
which had quite flat autonomy – saw mostly flat achievement.  Finally, at a higher level of initial 
achievement, Germany’s increased autonomy, particularly over course offerings, goes along with 
consistent increases in achievement.  Great Britain, Australia, Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden all 
slightly reduced their autonomy, which is mirrored by slightly decreasing achievement.  
4.  Empirical Model  
To test the effect of autonomy on student achievement and its dependence on a country’s 
development level more formally, we make use of the education production function framework   13 
introduced above.  The empirical issues can be most easily seen from a simple linear formulation 
which now introduces a time dimension to the analysis: 
(3)  cti cti S cti F ct cti S F I T          
where achievement T in country c at time t for student i is a function of a country’s institutions I 
(here autonomy), the inputs from a student’s family (F) and from schools (S), and an error term, 
ɛcti.  We start our exposition with a linearized and additive version of the model, but our analyses 
below will test for rich multiplicative interactions of the institutional effect with other input 
factors.  Our interest is estimating  / TI    , the impact of local autonomy on achievement 
holding constant other inputs.  For this, we have the panel data from PISA that has individual-
level data about T, F, and S and data about institutions I aggregated at the country level.  
Our approach to identify the impact of institutions is best seen by expanding the error term: 
(4)  cti c ct cti         
where  ηc  is  a  time-invariant  set  of  cultural  and  educational  factors  for  country  c  (such  as 
awareness  of  the  importance  of  education,  the  commitment  of  families  to  their  children’s 
education, or more generally the state of development of societal and economic institutions); ηct 
is a time-varying set of aggregate educational factors for country c (such as changes in spending 
levels or private involvement); and ηcti is an individual-specific, time-varying error.  
The key to identification of α, the parameter of interest, is that  ɛcti is orthogonal to the 
included  explanatory  factors  and,  importantly,  to  the  measure  of  local  autonomy.    The 
formulation in equation (4) shows the main elements of our approach.  First, at the individual 
student and school level, there are concerns about selection bias, reflecting unmeasured attributes 
of schools or students in circumstances with varying local decision-making.
18  If, for example, 
particularly good students are attracted to schools with more local autonomy, ηcti would tend to 
be correlated with I, leading to bias in the estimation of α.  But, by aggregating over all schools 
in the country and measuring autonomy by the proportion of schools with local autonomy, we 
eliminate the selection bias from school choice.  The aggregation also allows us to capture any 
general-equilibrium effect whereby, for example, autonomy of one school may elicit competitive 
responses from schools that do not have autonomy themselves.  
                                                 
18 These concerns are central to the interpretation of most within-country analyses of decentralization.   14 
Second, with the panel data, we can include country fixed effects, μc, which effectively 
eliminate any stable country-specific factors contained in ηc,
19  
(5)  cti t c cti S cti F ct cti S F I T              
By implication, the estimation of α is based upon variations in autonomy over time, since time-
invariant institutional features are absorbed into the country fixed effect.  The relevant variation 
with which we estimate α is within-country changes for our sample of PISA countries.  
The most significant remaining issue is whether there are time-varying country factors (ηct) 
that are correlated with the pattern of local autonomy in the country.  The underlying identifying 
assumption is that there are no educationally important time-varying country factors that are 
correlated with variation in the institutional input, I.  We will partially test this by including 
several additional time-varying factors of countries’ education systems, Cct, in the analysis:  
(6)  cti t c ct C cti S cti F ct cti C S F I T                
Other details are also important.  In order to obtain the best estimates of α, we attempt to 
eliminate as much other variation in test scores as possible by estimating the β parameters for 
family and school effects on a large set of individual measures and by conducting the estimation 
at the individual student level.  Additionally, the limited variation in institutional factors – which 
occurs  at  the  country  level  –  means  that  it  is  hard  to  simultaneously  estimate  measures  of 
alternative  forms  of  local  decision-making.    As  a  result,  most  of  our  analysis  sequentially 
estimates models with combined autonomy measures, although we also report specifications that 
include several autonomy measures together. 
A  central  component  of  the  analysis  is  the  possibility  of  significant  interactions  of 
institutional  factors  with  other  institutions  or  country-specific  elements  such  as  school 
accountability  systems  or  level  of  capacity  and  stage  of  development.    We  pursue  this 
parametrically by interacting I, the specific measure of autonomy in each model, with the initial 
level of development (of the country and/or educational system), Dc: 
(7)    12 cti ct ct c F cti S cti C ct c t cti T I I D F S C                   
                                                 
19 The estimation also includes time fixed effects to allow for any common shocks across waves.   15 
In this model, which represents our main specification, the effect of autonomy reforms is allowed 
to differ depending on the surrounding conditions captured by Dc.  We can then test our main 
conceptual proposition that autonomy is beneficial for student achievement in otherwise well-
functioning systems but detrimental in dysfunctional systems.  
5.  Results 
5.1  Main Results 
Conventional estimation identifies the effect of autonomy from the cross-sectional variation.  
For comparison to our identification below, such models are reported in Table 3.  A simple 
pooled cross-section with school autonomy measured at the individual level shows a positive 
association of the three areas of autonomy with student achievement in math (significant for 
academic-content and budget autonomy), after controlling for standard measures of family and 
school background (column 1).  There is little indication that this association differs across levels 
of  development,  although  the  positive  association  of  academic-content  autonomy  seems  to 
increase slightly with a country’s development level, measured by the initial GDP per capita in 
2000 (column 2).  When averaging the autonomy measures at the country level (while keeping 
all other variables at the individual level) to ignore the within-country variation in autonomy, 
which may be highly prone to self-selection, the estimates increase substantially (column 3).  
Again, there is little sign of effect heterogeneity across development levels (column 4).  
However, results change dramatically when, consistent with our identification strategy, we 
focus on within-country changes over time.  The cross-sectional association vanishes, with point 
estimates turning negative, once country fixed effects are added (column 5), where the autonomy 
effect is now identified from aggregate within-country variation over time.  Still, this average 
effect may hide substantial heterogeneity of the autonomy effect across countries.  
Thus, Table 4, which shows our main results, adds an interaction term of autonomy with 
initial GDP per capita to the panel specification with country fixed effects and with autonomy 
measured  at  the  country  level.
20  The  results  indicate  clear  evidence  of  substantial  effect 
heterogeneity for all three areas of autonomy: The autonomy effects become significantly more 
                                                 
20  Table  A1  in  the  appendix  shows  the  coefficients  of  the  control  variables  in  this  specification  for  the 
academic-content autonomy category.    16 
positive with increasing initial GDP per capita.  GDP per capita is centered at $8,000 (in 2000) in 
this  specification,  implying  that  the  main  effect  reflects  the  impact  of  autonomy  on  student 
achievement in a country at the upper end of the upper-middle-income category of countries such 
as Argentina (see Table 1 and Figure 3).  
As indicated by the negative main effect, a country near Argentina’s level of development 
that increased its academic-content autonomy over time would expect to see a significant and 
substantial drop in achievement.  In such a country, going from no autonomy to full autonomy 
over academic content would reduce math achievement by 0.34 standard deviations according to 
this model.  Moreover, the significant positive interaction indicates that the autonomy effect is 
significantly negative for all low- and middle-income countries in our sample.  At the extreme of 
the poorest country in our sample (Indonesia at $803 GDP per capita in 2000), the negative 
effect of academic-content autonomy reaches 0.55 standard deviations (column 3).   
By contrast, the effect of academic-content autonomy turns significantly positive in most of 
the high-income countries.  For the richest country in our sample (Luxembourg at $46,457 GDP 
per capita in 2000), the positive effect of academic-content autonomy is as large as 0.79 standard 
deviations (column 4).  The level of 2000 GDP per capita at which the autonomy effect switches 
its sign from negative to positive is $19,555 (column 2).  As is evident from Table A3 in the 
appendix, this pattern holds separately for all three categories of autonomy – course offerings, 
course  content,  and  textbooks  –  contained  in  the  aggregated  measure  of  academic-content 
autonomy in this table.  
As the lower two panels show, the basic pattern of results is quite similar in the other two 
areas  of  autonomy  –  personnel  and  budget  autonomy.    The  autonomy  effect  increases 
significantly with initial GDP per capita, and there is a large and significant positive autonomy 
effect for rich countries.  The only difference from the academic-content autonomy category is 
that the negative effect in the categories of personnel and budget autonomy is smaller and not 
statistically distinguishable from zero at the upper end of the upper-middle-income countries.  
For budget autonomy, the negative autonomy effect does not reach statistical significance for 
even the poorest country in our sample.  
The substantial correlation between the different categories of autonomy limits the extent to 
which we can distinguish among the three categories, but Table 5 presents models with pairs of 
two  autonomy  variables,  as  well  as  all  three  of  them,  combined.    When  academic-content   17 
autonomy  is  included  together  with  the  other  autonomy  categories,  only  the  interaction  of 
academic-content autonomy with initial GDP per capita retains statistical significance.  When 
only personnel and budget autonomy are included, the interaction of initial GDP per capita with 
personnel autonomy is statistically significant but the interaction with budget autonomy is not.  
Given the high correlation of academic-content and personnel autonomy (Table 2) and the size of 
the  standard  errors,  multicollinearity  does  not  allow  us  to  rule  out  a  substantial  positive 
interaction for personnel autonomy.  However, given that the correlation of budget autonomy 
with the other autonomy categories is quite low, these specifications tentatively indicate that 
budget autonomy has no separate effect once the other autonomy categories are considered.
21  
Therefore, in the remainder of the paper, we focus on the two aggregated measures of autonomy 
over academic content and over personnel.  
5.2  Robustness Tests  
Several  extended  tests  confirm  the  robustness  of  our  main  finding.    The  various 
modifications for measurement issues and estimation samples leave our basic findings intact.  
The first set of robustness tests relates to the measurement of variables.  The main results 
prove quite independent of the specific way in which the interaction with initial GDP per capita 
is specified.  As shown in the first three columns of Table 6, the basic result does not change 
when  initial  GDP  per  capita  is  not  measured  linearly,  but  instead  in  logs;  as  a  dummy  for 
countries with a GDP per capita higher than $8,000 (roughly the upper end of the upper-middle-
income category of countries in our sample); or as a dummy for countries with higher-than-
median GDP per capita in our sample (which is at $14,000).  
Our main model includes measures of school characteristics, but the final columns of Table 
6 show that results are robust to alternative treatments of school controls.  First, giving autonomy 
to schools may mean that schools use their autonomy to alter other school characteristics, such as 
reducing the school size or raising teacher education requirements.  Such changes would thus be 
channels through which school autonomy affects student outcomes.  In this perspective, these 
school measures should not be controlled for in the estimation.  As is evident in column 4, 
leaving the school-level variables out of our basic model does not affect our qualitative results.  
                                                 
21 The significant correlation between the change in budget and personnel autonomy (panel B of Table 2) 
suggests that there is still some possibility that multicollinearity is driving the lack of significance.   18 
Second, there may be a concern that other school reforms may have coincided with the 
autonomy  reforms  that  identify  our  main  result.    To  capture  such  other  reforms,  column  5 
includes all school variables measured as country averages, aggregating them to the same level at 
which the autonomy variables are measured.  Despite concerns with statistical power with a large 
number of country-level variables, the qualitative results for autonomy again remain the same.  
Autonomy reforms might also have coincided with expenditure reforms across countries.  
Because there is no consistent data on expenditure per student for all countries and waves, our 
basic model does not control for expenditure per student.  But for the waves 2000-2006, we have 
consistent data on annual expenditures per student in lower secondary education for a subset of 
(mostly  OECD)  countries.    The  first  column  of  Table  7  shows  that  our  basic  results  hold 
similarly  in  this  subset  of  country-by-wave  observations.    Column  2  adds  the  expenditure 
variable to this model, and the qualitative results are unaffected.  Changes in expenditure per 
student are actually significantly negatively related to changes in student achievement, which 
dilutes concerns about the lack of expenditure controls in our basic specification.  The coefficient 
on expenditures may capture forces that push for increased spending but that at the same time 
lower the efficiency of their use.
22  
The other four columns of Table 7 test for robustness in different sub-samples.  The PISA 
math test was scaled to have mean 500 and standard deviation 100 across the OECD countries in 
2000 and in 2003 each, and it was designed psychometrically to have a common scale since 
2003.  Column 3 shows that results are qualitatively unaffected when dropping the 2000 wave 
and restricting the analysis to the three waves since 2003 in which the tests are psychometrically 
scaled to be intertemporally comparable.  
In order to ensure that the effect is identified only from long-term changes and not driven by 
short-term oscillations, column 4 restricts the analysis to waves 2000 and 2009.  When identified 
from the nine-year differences in autonomy and test scores, results are even more pronounced 
than in the four-wave specification.  
Our main specification employs an unbalanced sample, as some countries did not participate 
in all four PISA waves (see Figure 1).  Column 5 of Table 7 replicates our analysis for the fully 
                                                 
22  As  reviewed  in  Hanushek  and  Woessmann  (2011),  international  comparative  studies  of  the  impact  of 
expenditures  provide  mixed  results  but  tend  to  indicate  no  consistent  relationships  between  spending  and 
international test scores.    19 
balanced sample of 29 countries with achievement and autonomy data in all four PISA waves.  
Again,  qualitative  results  are  the  same.    Column  6  restricts  the  sample  to  OECD  countries, 
without substantive changes in results.  
Additional robustness tests show that results also do not hinge on any specific country being 
included in the estimation.  All results are robust when we drop one country at a time from the 
estimation sample.
23  In particular, results look very similar when Luxembourg – a slight outlier 
with the highest GDP per capita (see Figure 3) – is excluded from the sample.  
Finally, results are also very similar when we separate the student and country estimations 
into two steps.  In the two-step model, test scores are “cleaned” from impacts of the student- and 
school-level controls in a first, student-level regression.  The residuals of this regression, which 
capture that part of the test-score variation that cannot be attributed to the controls, are then 
collapsed  to  the  country-by-wave  level.    In  a  second,  country-level  regression,  we  use  the 
country-level data to run a “classical” panel fixed-effects model, where the level of observation 
coincides both with the level of the fixed effects and with the level at which the variables of 
interest are measured.  Results (shown in Table A4 in the appendix) are qualitatively the same as 
in our preferred one-step specification, and they do not differ depending on whether the model 
does or does not already include country fixed effects in the estimation of the first step.  
5.3  Specification Tests  
Our  identification  derives  from  country-level  variation  in  autonomy  over  time  and  its 
interaction with  initial  development  levels  in  a panel  model  with  country  fixed effects.   To 
analyze  the  validity  of  the  specification,  we  present  a  set  of  specification  tests  that  address 
several  possible  remaining  concerns  with  the  identification  and  that  also  indicate  possible 
channels and sources of heterogeneity in the impacts.  Given that the tests corroborate our main 
specification  mostly  by  producing  the  result  of  insignificant  alternative  effects,  we  simply 
summarize the findings here.  Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.  
A  first  possible  concern  with  identification  from  panel  variation  is  that  variation  in 
autonomy  over  time  may  be  endogenous  to  the  initial  level  of  student  achievement.    For 
example,  poor  initial  achievement  might  theoretically  induce  governments  to  implement 
decentralization – or centralization – reforms.  In order to test for the empirical relevance of this 
                                                 
23 Detailed results are available from the authors on request.    20 
concern, we estimate several models where the changes in autonomy that identify our results are 
regressed on initial PISA scores.  Thus, we test whether the PISA score in 2000 predict the 
change in autonomy from 2000 to 2003 or from 2000 to 2009.  We also test whether the PISA 
level in one cycle predicts the change in autonomy from this to the subsequent cycle in a panel 
model of the four PISA waves.  In all tests, lagged PISA scores do not significantly predict 
subsequent changes in autonomy, corroborating the identifying assumption of our panel model.  
A  second  possible  concern  is  that  the  development  level  may  interact  not  only  with 
autonomy  reforms,  but  also  with  other  education  policy  measures.    In  other  words,  the 
heterogeneity  of impact may not be specific to the dimension of school autonomy, as other 
policies may also be more effective within a well-functioning surrounding.  To investigate this, 
we included in the regression interactions of initial GDP per capita with country-level measures 
of several other features of the school system: competition (proxied by the share of privately 
operated schools), funding sources (share of public funding in the school budget), school size 
(number of students per school), teacher education (share of certified teachers), and shortage of 
math teachers.  Our results show that none of these variables interacts significantly with initial 
GDP per capita in determining student achievement, and the autonomy results remain robust 
when these additional interactions are included in the model.  
Third, to investigate whether the heterogeneity of the autonomy effect is specific to the 
development  level  and  does  not  capture  heterogeneity  with  respect  to  other  country 
characteristics, we also estimated specifications that interact autonomy with a number of other 
country measures.  (For interactions specifically with the overall performance of the education 
system and with accountability, see the next section).  Some of these measures may also be 
interpreted as possible channels through which the level of economic development may matter 
for the impact of autonomy on student achievement.  Specifically, autonomy may interact with 
the size of a country, as school autonomy may mean different things in small and large countries; 
with its ethnic homogeneity, as autonomy may  work better in homogenous societies; with a 
country’s political regime, corruption level, or governance effectiveness, which may determine 
restraints on how well autonomy can work; or with a country’s culture, which may be more or 
less complementary to autonomous decision-making.  In addition, parental human capital may 
moderate the quality of local monitoring, their ability to pay for private schooling may affect the 
incentives of autonomous schools, and autonomous schools may use specific local policies.    21 
Thus,  we  estimated  specifications  that  interact  autonomy  with  population  size;  with  the 
Alesina et al. (2003) measure of ethnic fractionalization; with the Polity IV index that measures 
governing authority  on  a scale from  institutionalized autocracies  to  consolidated democracy; 
with  the  corruption  perceptions  index  of  Transparency  International;  with  the  Governance 
Effectiveness Index of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators project, which aims 
to capture the perceived quality of public services and of policy formulation and implementation; 
and  with  the  six  Hofstede  dimensions  of  national  culture,  in  particular  the  measures  of 
individualism versus collectivism (integration into groups) and of power distance (acceptance of 
power  inequality).    We  also  interacted  autonomy  with  average  measures  of  parents’  human 
capital available in the PISA dataset (white collar occupations and books at home), with the 
share of private funding in the school budget, and with such school aspects as the share of 
certified teachers, shortages of math teachers, school size, and share of private schools.  
In  models  that  enter  these  interactions  separately  and  do  not  include  the  interaction  of 
autonomy with initial GDP per capita, there is an indication that autonomy interacts positively 
with  democracy,  government  effectiveness,  individualism,  the  share  of  privately  operated 
schools, and the share of certified teachers, and negatively with population size, corruption, and 
acceptance of power inequality.  However, in all these cases, the significance of the interaction 
vanishes once the interaction of academic-content autonomy with initial GDP per capita is also 
entered, and the latter retains statistical significance throughout.
24  Thus, while the interaction 
with the development level clearly entails dimensions of democracy, governance effectiveness, 
cultural  values,  and  effective  school  environments,  the  overall  measure  of  economic 
development in terms of GDP per capita dominates these other separate interactions.  Variations 
in  these  other  measures  that  are  not  correlated  with  the  standard  measure  of  economic 
development do not interact significantly with the autonomy effect.  
Fourth, we test whether the autonomy effect is heterogeneous for students with different 
individual social backgrounds.  Such heterogeneity may reflect another channel of the autonomy 
effect,  as  decentralization  may  work  better  with  sophisticated  parents  (Galiani,  Gertler,  and 
Schargrodsky (2008)).  It also provides evidence on the effect of autonomy on inequality, as 
                                                 
24 Results for personnel and budget autonomy are similar, but sometimes less strong.  While the negative 
interaction  of  autonomy  with  ethnic  fractionalization  is  insignificant  in  the  separate  model,  it  turns  marginally 
significant in the model that also includes the interaction of autonomy with initial GDP per capita (which is fully 
robust), indicating that autonomy may work better in ethnically more homogeneous countries.    22 
differential impacts by social background would narrow or widen the performance gap between 
well-off and disadvantaged families.  To test this, we add interaction terms between autonomy 
and family background measures as well as the triple interaction between autonomy, initial GDP 
per capita, and the family measures to our basic specification.  Our measures of individual family 
background  include  parental  white-collar  occupation,  parental  university  education,  books  at 
home, and immigration  background.   For all  four  measures,  neither the interaction with  the 
autonomy  variable  nor  the  triple  interaction  is  statistically  significant,  and  point  estimates 
suggest different directions of effects.  Consequently, autonomy reforms do not seem to affect 
children  from  different  background  differently  and  thus  do  not  seem  to  magnify  or  lessen 
inequality, either in developed or in developing countries.
25 
5.4  Further Results 
While the results so far relate to math achievement, which is most readily tested comparably 
across countries, PISA also tested students in reading and science.  As shown in column 1 of 
Table 8, results are qualitatively the same in reading.  This is particularly interesting because 
reading scores have been psychometrically scaled to be comparable over all four PISA waves.  
Results on academic-content autonomy are also found for science achievement, where results on 
personnel autonomy are less pronounced and lose statistical significance (column 2).  
In  our  analysis  so  far,  we  have  defined  autonomy  as  a  school  entity  having  the  sole 
responsibility  for  a  task.    Alternatively,  one  can  consider  cases  where  a  school  entity  has 
considerable responsibility, but an authority beyond the school has considerable responsibility as 
well – something that one might term “joint decision-making.”  Conceptually, one might expect 
that  both  the  negative  and  the  positive  aspects  of  autonomy  discussed  in  our  conceptual 
framework might be somewhat limited when an external authority has a joint say on a matter.  
To test this, we use as an alternative autonomy measure the share of schools in a country that 
have considerable responsibility on a task but where an external authority may also have a say.   
                                                 
25 We also estimated a specification that adds an interaction of autonomy with the initial Gini coefficient of 
income inequality, provided by the World Bank.  While the interaction of autonomy with the initial per-capita GDP 
level  remains  qualitatively  unaffected,  there  is  also  some  indication  that  academic-content  autonomy  is  more 
beneficial in more equal societies.  However, this pattern is not confirmed by distributional measures of family 
background taken from the PISA dataset that directly relate to the parents of the tested students.   23 
Column 3 of Table 8 shows that results are considerably weaker for this “joint authority” 
measure of school autonomy than for the measure of “full” school autonomy used throughout 
this paper.  Both negative and positive effects of autonomy are reduced when external education 
authorities may also have a say in decision-making.  Thus, the main effects of autonomy derive 
from independent decision-making at the school level.  
6.  Adding Accountability and Educational Development  
The prior analysis presumes that a country’s income level can sufficiently characterize the 
set of institutional features that are complementary to local autonomy in schools – including, for 
example, experience with general economic structures, the importance of the rule of law as seen 
in economic operations, generally functioning governmental institutions, and the like.  It has the 
potential disadvantages of ignoring specific educational institutions and the overall development 
of the educational sector.  For these reasons, we present exploratory estimates of more education-
specific features of a country that might provide a more refined look at autonomy.  
As described in our conceptual principal-agent framework, the effect of autonomy may not 
only depend on the level of development, but also on the extent to which a school system directly 
monitors results through accountability systems.  Existing cross-sectional research has found 
significant  interactions  of  school-level  autonomy  with  country-level  existence  of  the 
accountability measure of central exit exams across countries (see Woessmann (2005); Hanushek 
and Woessmann (2011)).  Thus, the first column of Table 9 adds an interaction term between 
autonomy and central exit exams to our basic model.  There is a sizeable positive interaction 
between (time-variant) school autonomy and the (time-invariant) measure of central exit exams, 
statistically significant in the case of academic-content autonomy.  The effect of introducing 
autonomy is more positive in countries that hold the system accountable by central exit exams.  
At the same time, our main effect of an interaction between autonomy and level of development 
is unaffected by including the autonomy-exam interaction.  As is evident in column 2, there is no 
significant triple interaction between autonomy, exams, and initial GDP per capita, suggesting 
that the impact of the development level on the autonomy effect does not depend on whether 
there are central exams in the school system, and vice versa.  
We  have  consistently  measured  the  initial  level  of  development  by  overall  economic 
development (GDP per capita).  An alternative way of measuring development is to look at the   24 
achievement level of the education system, which we measure by the initial average PISA score 
in 2000.  As shown in Table 10, the effect of school autonomy indeed increases significantly 
with the initial achievement level.  The negative autonomy effect in poorly performing systems 
is again larger for academic-content autonomy than for personnel autonomy.  For a country at the 
relatively low initial achievement level of 400 PISA points, equivalent to one standard deviation 
below the OECD mean, going from no to full school autonomy reduces student achievement by 
0.63  standard  deviations  in  academic-content  autonomy  and  by  0.33  standard  deviations  in 
personnel  autonomy.    The  coefficient  estimates  imply  that  the  autonomy  effect  turns  from 
negative  to  positive  at  a  performance  level  of  485  and  449  PISA  points,  respectively,  for 
academic-content and for personnel autonomy.  At the level of the highest-performing country 
(Hong Kong with a test score of 560.5), the positive effect of academic-content autonomy is as 
large as 0.56 standard deviations, and 0.72 standard deviations for personnel autonomy.  
Column 2 of Table 10 jointly enters the interactions of autonomy with the initial PISA score 
and  with  initial  GDP  per  capita.    Both  retain  statistical  significance  for  interactions  with 
academic-content autonomy, while limited statistical power has the two interaction terms shy of 
statistical significance for personnel autonomy.  Initial educational achievement and initial GDP 
per capita may thus capture two separable dimensions of the performance level of a country that 
have relevance for how school autonomy affects student outcomes.
26  
For  robustness,  the  final  two  columns  use  alternative  forms  of  measuring  initial 
achievement.  In column 3, qualitative results are similar when the initial achievement level is 
not measured linearly but as a dummy for countries scoring higher than 400 PISA points (one 
standard  deviation  below  the  OECD  mean).    Similarly,  results  hold  when  measuring  initial 
achievement by a dummy for countries scoring higher than the OECD mean of 500 PISA points 
(column 4).  Results are also very similar for a dummy for countries above the sample median of 
480 PISA scores (not shown).  
We  find  both  of  these  extensions  –  accountability  and  development  of  the  educational 
system per se – to be highly suggestive of a more nuanced view of autonomy.  At the same time, 
the limitations of our cross-country approach that come from relatively small effective samples 
of countries and from imperfect measurement of specific institutions lead us to be cautious in the 
                                                 
26  Results  are  robust  to  dropping  the  former  Communist  countries,  which  –  as  seen  in  Figure  3  –  are 
noteworthy outliers in the plot of initial GDP per capita against initial achievement.    25 
interpretation.    We  think  there  are  conceptual  reasons  that  lend  credence  to  these  results, 
particularly about accountability, but there are many details about the form and consequences of 
accountability that are ignored.
27 
7.  Conclusions 
Decentralization of decision-making has been hotly debated in many countries of the world, 
and prior research has left considerable uncertainty about the expected impact of giving more 
autonomy to schools.  In the face of this uncertainty, many countries have changed the locus of 
decision-making  within  their  countries  over  the  past  decade  –  and  interestingly  some  have 
decentralized  while  others  have  centralized.    We  exploit  this  cross-country  variation  to 
investigate the impact of local autonomy on student achievement.  We identify the effect of 
school autonomy from within-country changes in the share of autonomous schools over time in a 
panel analysis with country (and time) fixed effects.   
Our central finding is that autonomy reforms improve student achievement in developed 
countries, but undermine it in developing countries.  At low levels of economic development, 
increased  autonomy  actually  hurts  student  outcomes,  in  particular  in  decision-making  areas 
related to academic content.  By contrast, in high-income countries, increased autonomy over 
academic content, personnel, and budgets exerts positive effects on student achievement.  In 
general, the autonomy effects are most pronounced in decision-making on academic content, 
with some additional relevance for personnel autonomy and, less so, for budgetary autonomy.  
Empirically,  the  main  result  proves  highly  consistent  across  a  series  of  robustness  and 
specification  checks.    Among  others,  the  autonomy  effects  show  up  in  various  forms  of 
measuring initial GDP per capita, alternative specifications of the control model, and different 
sub-samples in terms of included waves and countries.  The basic finding of heterogeneity of the 
impact  of  autonomy  by  development  level  shows  up  in  students’  performance  in  math,  in 
reading, and in science.  It is much more pronounced for full school-level autonomy than for 
joint authority between schools and external authorities.   
In terms of the model specification, we confirm that policy decisions about the introduction 
of autonomy reforms are not related to previous achievement levels, corroborating the panel 
                                                 
27 To illustrate the details on accountability, see the alternative estimates of its impact on student achievement 
in the U.S. (Figlio and Loeb (2011)).   26 
identification.  In addition, there are no significant interactions of the development level with 
other  education  policy  measures,  suggesting  that  the  specific  institutional  effect  and  its 
heterogeneity are particular to autonomy reforms.  Also, the significant interaction of autonomy 
with the level of economic development prevails when interactions of autonomy with measures 
of democracy, governance effectiveness, cultural values, and effective school environments are 
additionally taken into account, and the latter interactions are not significantly related to student 
outcomes once the interaction with economic development is held constant.  Finally, there is no 
indication  that  autonomy  differentially  affects  students  with  well-off  and  disadvantaged 
backgrounds.  This suggests that autonomy reforms do not affect inequality between students 
with different social backgrounds in either developed or developing countries.  
There is an indication that local decision-making works better when there is also external 
accountability that limits any opportunistic behavior of schools.  Further, having generally well-
functioning  schools,  indicated  by  initial  performance  levels,  appears  complementary  with 
autonomy.  Nonetheless, these specific issues require further research and confirmation. 
From an analytical perspective, the innovation in this work is the development of panel data 
that permit cross-country analysis.  Within this framework, we can exploit the pattern of policy 
changes within countries to obtain cleaner estimates of the institutional differences. 
Does school autonomy make sense everywhere?  Our results indicate that the impact of 
school  autonomy  on  student  achievement  is  highly  heterogeneous,  varying  by  the  level  of 
development  of  a  country.  This  overall  result  may  have  broader  implications  for  the 
generalizability of findings across countries and education systems.  It suggests that lessons from 
educational policies in developed countries may not translate directly into advice for developing 
countries, and vice versa.   27 
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Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Table A1:  Descriptive statistics and complete model of basic specification 
  Descriptive statistics  Basic model 
   Mean  Std. dev.  Coeff.  Std. err. 
Academic-content autonomy  0.663  0.259  -34.018
***  (12.211) 
Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP p.c.  5.760  8.512  2.944
***  (0.590) 
Student and family characteristics         
Female   0.502    -13.028
***  (0.917) 
Age (years)  15.750  0.108  13.449
***  (1.335) 
Immigration background         
     Native student  0.914       
     First generation student  0.043    -20.976
***  (4.690) 
     Non-native student  0.043    -12.607
**  (5.124) 
Other language than test language or national 
dialect spoken at home  0.092    -9.181
**  (3.692) 
Parents’ education         
    None   0.020       
    Primary  0.079    10.697
***  (2.115) 
    Lower secondary  0.107    11.724
***  (2.610) 
    Upper secondary I  0.096    20.863
***  (3.381) 
    Upper secondary II  0.277    25.784
***  (2.866) 
    University  0.421    32.766
***  (3.019) 
Parents’ occupation         
     Blue collar low skilled  0.116       
     Blue collar high skilled  0.152    6.013
***  (1.184) 
     White collar low skilled  0.229    14.502
***  (1.155) 
     White collar high skilled  0.502    35.714
***  (1.953) 
Books at home         
     0-10 books  0.139       
     11-100 books  0.464    29.430
***  (2.339) 
     101-500 books  0.311    63.003
***  (2.650) 
     More than 500 books  0.086    74.589
***  (3.329) 
School characteristics         
Number of students  782  327  0.016
***  (0.003) 
Privately operated  0.191    6.438  (4.481) 
Share of government funding  0.841  0.154  -18.628
***  (5.153) 
Share of fully certified teachers at school  0.783  0.257  15.669
***  (3.786) 
Shortage of  math teachers  0.178    6.984
***  (1.449) 
School’s community location          
     Village or rural area (<3,000)   0.110       
     Town (3,000-15,000)  0.212    4.816
**  (2.220) 
     Large town (15,000-100,000)  0.326    8.097
***  (2.563) 
     City (100,000-1,000,000)   0.222    11.182
***  (3.016) 
     Large city (>1,000,000)  0.129    12.191
***  (3.633) 
GDP per capita (1,000 $)  23,199  18,785  0.416
*  (0.245) 
Country fixed effects       Yes 
Year fixed effects      Yes 
Student observations  1,042,995    1,042,995 
Country observations   42    42 
Country-by-wave observations   155    155 
R
2       0.385 
Notes:    Descriptive  statistics:  Mean:  international  mean  (weighted  by  sampling  probabilities).    Std.  dev.: 
international  standard  deviation  (only  for  continuous  variables).    Basic  model:  Full  results  of  the  specification 
reported in the top panel of Table 4.  Dependent variable:  PISA math test score.  Least squares regression weighted 
by students’ sampling probability.  Regression includes imputation dummies.  Robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent. Table A2:  Questionnaire item on autonomy across PISA waves 
Wave  Question  Answer options 
2000  In your school, who has the main responsibility for …  
(Please tick as many boxes as appropriate in each row) 
Not a school responsibility 




2003  In your school, who has the main responsibility for …  
(Please tick as many boxes as appropriate in each row) 
Not a main responsibility of the school 




2006  Regarding your school, who has a considerable responsibility for the following tasks?  
(Please tick as many boxes as appropriate in each row) 
Principals or teachers 
School governing board 
Regional or local education authority 
National education authority 
2009  Regarding your school, who has a considerable responsibility for the following tasks? 
(Please tick as many boxes as appropriate in each row) 
Principals 
Teachers  
School governing board  
Regional or local education authority 
National education authority 
Notes:  For each decision-making task, we constructed a variable indicating full autonomy at the school level if the principal, the school’s board, department 
heads, or teachers carry sole responsibility.  Consequently, if the task is not a school responsibility (2000 and 2003 data) or the responsibility is also carried at 
regional/local or national education authorities (2006 and 2009 data), we do not classify a school as autonomous.  Figure 2 does not indicate consistent changes 
across waves in the measure of autonomy over countries or tasks, indicating that changes in response options are unlikely to substantially affect our estimates.  
Furthermore, in our models, time fixed effects capture consistent changes between waves.   
Table A3:  Disaggregation of basic model:  Results for separate autonomy categories  
  Estimation result    Details on autonomy effect at different levels of GDP per capita 
 
Main effect  
(at initial GDP  
p.c. of $8000) 
Interaction  
with initial GDP 
per capita 
 
GDP p.c. at which 
autonomy effect 
switches sign 
Effect in country 
with minimum  
GDP p.c. 
Effect in country 
with maximum  
GDP p.c. 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5) 
School autonomy over courses   -21.973
***  2.380
***    17,232  -39.102
***  69.567
*** 
  (8.022)  (0.481)      (10.308)  (15.723) 
R
2   0.385      0.385  0.385 
School autonomy over content  -27.604
**  2.303
***    19,986  -44.174
***  60.952
*** 
  (10.283)  (0.513)      (12.826)  (15.951) 
R
2   0.385      0.385  0.385 
School autonomy over textbooks  -23.635
***  2.762
***    16,557  -43.514
***  82.604
*** 
  (8.207)  (0.779)      (11.409)  (28.213) 
R
2   0.385      0.385  0.385 
School autonomy over hiring  -31.763
*  3.266
***    17,725  -55.262
**  93.826
*** 
  (16.369)  (1.100)      (22.920)  (31.892) 
R
2   0.384      0.384  0.384 
School autonomy over salaries  -2.115  2.476
**    8,854  -19.932  93.103
** 
  (12.467)  (1.156)      (16.211)  (43.917) 
R
2   0.384      0.384  0.384 
School autonomy over budget allocations  -5.935  1.914
**    11,101  -19.707  67.665
*** 
  (9.369)  (0.730)      (12.970)  (24.346) 
R
2   0.384      0.384  0.384 
Notes:  Each panel presents results of a separate regression.  Dependent variable:  PISA math test score.  Least squares regression weighted by students’ sampling 
probability, including country (and year) fixed effects.  School autonomy measured as country average.  In the main estimation, initial GDP per capita is centered 
at $8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000.  Sample: 
student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.  Sample size in each specification: 1,042,995 students, 42 countries, 155 country-by-wave 
observations.  Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, language spoken at 
home;  school location, school size, share of  fully certified teachers at school, shortage of  math teachers, private vs. public school  management, share of 
government funding at school; country’s GDP per capita, country fixed effects, year fixed effects; and imputation dummies.  Robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.    
Table A4:  Alternative estimation of the impact of autonomy:  Country-level estimation of two-step model 
  First step does not include  
country fixed effects  
First step includes  
country fixed effects 
   (1)  (2) 
Academic-content autonomy  -30.247
**  -26.378
** 
  (12.757)  (10.691) 
Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP per capita  3.025
***  2.892
*** 
  (0.817)  (0.701) 
R
2   0.869  0.186 
Personnel autonomy   -8.219  -14.322 
  (1.494)  (15.116) 
Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita  3.172
**  3.348
*** 
  (17.284)  (1.257) 
R
2   0.856  0.099 
Budget autonomy  -8.700  -7.480 
  (12.141)  (10.773) 
Budget autonomy x Initial GDP per capita  1.679  0.945 
  (1.319)  (1.010) 
R
2   0.853  0.051 
Notes:  Each panel-by-column presents results of a separate regression.  Reported coefficients stem from a country-level least squares regression with country 
and year fixed effects, controlling for GDP per capita.  Sample: country-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.  Sample size in each 
specification: 155 country-by-wave observations covering a total of 42 countries.  Dependent variable:  Country-level aggregation of the residuals of a first-step 
estimation  at  the  student  level  that  regresses  the  PISA  math  test  score  on  student  gender,  age,  parental  occupation,  parental  education,  books  at  home, 
immigration status, language spoken at home, school location, school size, share of fully certified teachers at school, shortage of math teachers, private vs. public 
school management, share of government funding at school, and imputation dummies (and, in column 2, country’s GDP per capita, country fixed effects, and 
year fixed effects).  Initial GDP per capita is centered at $8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a 
country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.   
Figure 1:  Performance on the PISA math tests, 2000-2009  
 
Notes: Country mean performance in the PISA math test.  Own depiction based on PISA tests conducted in 2000/2002, 2003, 2006, and 2009.   
Figure 2:  School autonomy over courses and over hiring, 2000-2009 
 
Notes: Straight black lines: autonomy in deciding which courses are offered.  Dashed gray lines: autonomy in selecting teachers for hire.  Own 
depiction based on school background questionnaires in the PISA tests conducted in 2000/2002, 2003, 2006, and 2009.   
Figure 3:  Development level and PISA performance, 2000 
 
Notes: Test scores for Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Romania, and Thailand refer to 2002.  Test scores for Slovak 
Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay refer to 2003.   
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics by country 
  GDP per capita  PISA math  
test score 
Academic-content 
autonomy   Personnel autonomy  Budget autonomy  
  2000  2000  2009  2000  2009  2000  2009  2000  2009 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Low-income countries
a                   
Indonesia
b  803  366.1  371.1  .915  .695  .689  .403  .973  .809 
Lower-middle-income countries
a                   
Brazil  3,701  332.8  386.0  .824  .516  .245  .156  .748  .348 
Bulgaria
b  1,600  429.6  427.9  .720  .410  .572  .796  .693  .923 
Romania
b  1,650  426.1  426.4  .737  .607  .113  .018  .996  .632 
Russia  1,775  478.3  467.9  .958  .574  .704  .658  .701  .538 
Thailand
b  1,968  432.7  418.6  .961  .900  .284  .316  .896  .916 
Tunisia
c  2,033  358.9  371.5  .100  .028  .150  .016  .978  .810 
Turkey
c  4,010  423.8  445.7  .598  .218  .065  .017  .683  .772 
Upper-middle-income countries
a                   
Argentina
b  7,693  387.4  387.6  .823  .407  .212  .266  .470  .738 
Chile
b  4,877  382.9  420.7  .900  .395  .394  .635  .651  .789 
Czech Republic  5,521  493.3  492.6  .878  .864  .834  .883  .990  .746 
Hungary  4689  483.3  490.0  .983  .681  .705  .744  .922  .943 
Latvia  3,302  461.7  481.5  .884  .413  .625  .523  .889  .826 
Mexico  5,934  386.8  418.5  .661  .317  .414  .305  .772  .783 
Poland
d  4,454  470.7  494.2  .821  .750  .607  .484  .903  .264 
Slovak Republic
c  5,326  498.6  496.7  .754  .521  .798  .686  .955  .698 
Uruguay
c  6,914  421.8  427.2  .392  .216  .198  .192  .504  .577 
(continued on next page)  
Table 1 (continued) 
  GDP per capita  PISA math  
test score 
Academic-content 
autonomy   Personnel autonomy  Budget autonomy  
  2000  2000  2009  2000  2009  2000  2009  2000  2009 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
High-income countries
a                   
Australia  21,768  533.7  514.6  .933  .708  .389  .373  .996  .934 
Austria  23,865  514.2  495.3  .700  .569  .076  .069  .925  .845 
Belgium  22,665  515.2  515.7  .726  .561  .512  .381  .992  .672 
Canada  23,559  533.0  526.3  .759  .323  .577  .315  .986  .763 
Denmark  29,992  513.7  503.2  .888  .684  .551  .596  .978  .981 
Finland  23,514  536.4  540.4  .954  .616  .181  .211  .987  .925 
Germany  23,114  485.5  512.1  .552  .644  .060  .176  .955  .975 
Greece  11,500  447.3  465.4  .902  .047  .689  .027  .946  .858 
Hong Kong
b  25,374  560.5  554.7  .991  .870  .586  .519  .978  .911 
Iceland  30,951  515.0  507.4  .797  .675  .517  .506  .871  .774 
Israel
b  19,836  433.6  447.4  .910  .506  .740  .379  .949  .658 
Ireland  25,380  503.0  487.3  .781  .687  .461  .327  .878  .898 
Italy  19,269  458.8  483.3  .716  .702  .057  .060  .570  .832 
Japan  36,789  556.8  529.2  .988  .919  .328  .324  .912  .902 
Korea  11,346  547.6  545.9  .973  .887  .234  .207  .947  .883 
Luxembourg  46,457  446.1  488.2  .000  .139  .025  .171  1  .809 
Netherlands
c  24,179  538.1  525.9  .978  .922  .594  .896  .994  1 
New Zealand  13,336  537.9  519.9  .957  .901  .586  .547  1  .992 
Norway
d  37,472  498.7  497.5  .571  .505  .325  .403  .982  .884 
Portugal  11,443  453.4  487.3  .581  .382  .068  .107  .949  .932 
Spain  14,421  476.4  483.7  .800  .538  .234  .185  .981  .959 
Sweden  27,879  509.7  493.9  .879  .727  .804  .768  .993  .929 
Switzerland  34,787  528.3  535.0  .381  .298  .526  .476  .868  .848 
United Kingdom  25,089  529.7  492.5  .978  .871  .854  .719  .999  .945 
United States  35,080  492.6  487.4  .912  .552  .867  .716  .986  .858 
Country average  16,317  477.3  477.7  .780  .571  .445  .394  .902  .811 
Notes:  PISA data: Country means, based on non-imputed data for each variable, weighted by sampling probabilities.  – = not available.  
a Country classification 
according to World Bank classification in 2002.  
b PISA data refer to 2002 instead of 2000.  
c PISA data refer to 2003 instead of 2000.  
d Autonomy data refer to 
2002 instead of 2000.    
Table 2:  Country-level correlation matrix of autonomy measures 
(A) 2009 levels  Courses  Content  Textbooks  Hiring  Salaries  Budget  Academic-
content  Personnel 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
School autonomy over courses  1               
School autonomy over content  0.739
***  1             
School autonomy over textbooks  0.511
***  0.598
***  1           
School autonomy over hiring  0.385
**  0.384
**  0.366
**  1         
School autonomy over salaries  0.417
***  0.398
***  0.209  0.576
***  1       
School autonomy over budget allocations  0.274
*  0.060  0.228  0.089  0.186  1     





***  0.215  1   





***  0.143  0.472
***  1 
 
(B) 2000-2009 differences  Courses  Content  Textbooks  Hiring  Salaries  Budget  Academic-
content  Personnel 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
School autonomy over courses  1               
School autonomy over content  0.461
***  1             
School autonomy over textbooks  0.560
***  0.547
***  1           
School autonomy over hiring  0.559
***  0.342
**  0.688
***  1         




***  1       
School autonomy over budget allocations  0.066  -0.150  0.199  0.403
**  0.427
**  1     





***  0.030  1   







***  1 
Notes:  Correlation coefficient of country-level autonomy measures across 42 countries.  Data for Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, 
Romania, and Thailand refer to 2002 instead of 2000.  Data for Slovak Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay refer to 2003 instead of 2000.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.    
Table 3:  Conventional cross-sectional estimation of the effect of school autonomy on student achievement 
Autonomy measured at level:  School    Country    Country 
Country fixed effects:  No    No    Yes 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5) 
Academic-content autonomy  20.713
***  13.539
*    47.201
***  37.114
**    -20.556 
  (6.181)  (7.455)    (11.257)  (14.076)    (12.627) 
Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP p.c.    0.771
*      0.908     
    (0.455)      (0.616)     
R
2   0.312  0.315    0.319  0.321    0.384 
Personnel autonomy   9.640  10.479    24.701
*  24.913
*    -0.180 
  (7.015)  (7.586)    (13.492)  (13.313)    (11.708) 
Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita    -0.103      -0.024     
    (0.535)      (1.055)     
R
2   0.310  0.310    0.312  0.312    0.384 
Budget autonomy  7.549
*  5.411    32.987  31.239    -7.163 
  (4.248)  (4.694)    (25.976)  (25.228)    (10.162) 
Budget autonomy x Initial GDP per capita    0.493      1.127
*     
    (0.336)      (0.631)     
R
2   0.310  0.310    0.311  0.313    0.384 
Notes:  Each column-by-panel presents results of a separate regression.  Dependent variable:  PISA math test score.  Least squares regression weighted by 
students’ sampling probability.  In columns 2 and 4, initial GDP per capita is centered at $8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of 
autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000.  Sample: student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.  
Sample size in each specification: 1,042,995 students, 42 countries, 155 country-by-wave observations.  Control variables include: student gender, age, parental 
occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, language spoken at home; school location, school size, share of fully certified teachers at 
school, shortage of math teachers, private vs. public school management, share of government funding at school; country’s GDP per capita, year fixed effects; 
and imputation dummies.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 
percent.    
Table 4:  Panel fixed-effects results on the effect of school autonomy on student achievement by development level  
  Estimation result    Details on autonomy effect at different levels of GDP per capita 
      GDP p.c. at which autonomy 
effect switches sign 
Effect in country with 
minimum GDP p.c. 
Effect in country with 
maximum GDP p.c. 
   (1)    (2)  (3)  (4) 
Academic-content autonomy  -34.018
***    19,555  -55.205
***  79.209
*** 
  (12.211)      (14.471)  (20.912) 
Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP p.c.  2.944
***         
  (0.590)         
R
2   0.385         
Personnel autonomy   -17.968    13,413  -41.854
**  109.687
*** 
  (14.071)      (19.201)  (37.857) 
Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita  3.319
***         
  (1.106)         
R
2   0.384         
Budget autonomy  -6.347    11,449  -19.576  64.351
** 
  (9.363)      (13.282)  (26.939) 
Budget autonomy x Initial GDP per capita  1.838
**         
  (0.796)         
R
2   0.384         
Notes:  Each panel presents results of a separate regression.  Dependent variable:  PISA math test score.  Least squares regression weighted by students’ sampling 
probability, including country (and year) fixed effects.  School autonomy measured as country average.  In the main estimation, initial GDP per capita is centered 
at $8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000.  Sample: 
student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.  Sample size in each specification: 1,042,995 students, 42 countries, 155 country-by-wave 
observations.  Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, language spoken at 
home;  school location, school size, share of  fully certified teachers at school, shortage of  math teachers,  private vs. public school  management, share of 
government funding at school; country’s GDP per capita, country fixed effects, year fixed effects; and imputation dummies.  Complete model of the first 
specification displayed in Table A1.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 
percent, 
* 10 percent.    
Table 5:  Robustness:  Impact of including several autonomy measures together in the same estimation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Academic-content autonomy  -42.013
***  -41.012
***  -33.732
***   
  (14.248)  (14.120)  (12.054)   
Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP p.c.  2.658
***  2.736
***  2.888
***   
  (0.674)  (0.676)  (0.616)   
Personnel autonomy   17.830  13.897    -14.998 
  (16.250)  (14.449)    (13.534) 
Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita  0.212  0.333    2.868
** 
  (1.293)  (1.256)    (1.184) 
Budget autonomy  -5.370    -1.918  -2.525 
  (8.858)    (8.106)  (9.205) 
Budget autonomy x Initial GDP per capita  0.240    0.151  1.049 
  (0.898)    (0.832)  (0.923) 
R
2   0.385  0.385  0.385  0.385 
Notes: Each column presents results of a separate regression.  Dependent variable:  PISA math test score.  Least squares regression weighted by students’ 
sampling probability, including country (and year) fixed effects.  School autonomy measured as country average.  Initial GDP per capita is centered at $8000 
(measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000.  Sample: student-
level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.  Sample size in each specification: 1,042,995 students, 42 countries, 155 country-by-wave 
observations.  Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, language spoken at 
home;  school  location, school size, share of  fully certified teachers at school, shortage of  math teachers, private vs. public school  management, share of 
government funding at school; country’s GDP per capita, country fixed effects, year fixed effects; and imputation dummies.  Robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.   
  
Table 6:  Robustness:  Different forms of measuring initial GDP per capita and different school controls 
Measure of initial GDP per capita:  log GDP p.c.  Dummy for GDP 
p.c. above $8,000 
Dummy for GDP 
p.c. above median 
($14,000) 
GDP per capita 




   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 






  (21.937)  (14.222)  (17.193)  (10.443)  (10.123) 






  (7.466)  (13.013)  (12.093)  (0.539)  (0.625) 
R
2   0.385  0.385  0.385  0.373  0.356 
Personnel autonomy   -55.008
*  -41.921
*  -21.154  -15.813  -15.993 
  (29.136)  (24.595)  (13.863)  (15.393)  (14.529) 




***  1.990 
  (10.172)  (27.308)  (20.026)  (0.968)  (1.300) 
R
2   0.384  0.384  0.384  0.372  0.356 
Notes:  Each panel-by-column presents results of a separate regression.  Dependent variable:  PISA math test score.  Least squares regression weighted by 
students’ sampling probability, including country (and year) fixed effects.  School autonomy measured as country average.  In columns 4 and 5, initial GDP per 
capita is centered at $8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 
of $8000.  Sample: student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.  Sample size in each specification: 1,042,995 students, 42 countries, 
155 country-by-wave observations.  Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, 
language  spoken  at  home;  school  location,  school  size,  share  of  fully  certified  teachers  at  school,  shortage  of  math  teachers,  private  vs.  public  school 
management, share of government funding at school; country’s GDP per capita, country fixed effects, year fixed effects; and imputation dummies.  Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.    
Table 7:  Robustness:  Including expenditure per student and different sub-samples of waves and countries 
Sample:  Sample with expenditure data  Waves 2003, 
2006, and 2009 






   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 





  (22.327)  (17.526)  (10.661)  (22.019)  (14.97)  (13.324) 







  (1.106)  (0.913)  (0.495)  (1.132)  (0.702)  (0.760) 
Expenditure per student (in 1000$)    -11.375
**         
    (4.826)         
R
2   0.362  0.363  0.389  0.382  0.362  0.308 
Personnel autonomy   -52.044
***  -39.557
**  -28.282  -7.312  -45.458
***  -21.601 
  (14.381)  (15.577)  (20.462)  (18.926)  (15.033)  (13.879) 







  (1.002)  (0.977)  (1.204)  (1.914)  (1.267)  (1.498) 
Expenditure per student (in 1000$)    -11.867
*         
    (5.932)         
R
2   0.361  0.362  0.389  0.379  0.361  0.308 
Students  392,862  392,862  931,831  435,502  846,221  835,478 
Countries   29  29  42  36  29  31 
Countries-by-waves  69  69  120  72  116  116 
Notes:  Each panel-by-column presents results of a separate regression.  Dependent variable:  PISA math test score.  Least squares regression weighted by 
students’ sampling probability, including country (and year) fixed effects.  School autonomy measured as country average.  Initial GDP per capita is centered at 
$8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000.  Sample: 
student-level observations in the sample indicated on top of each column.  Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental education, 
books at home, immigration status, language spoken at home; school location, school size, share of fully certified teachers at school, shortage of math teachers, 
private vs. public school management, share of government funding at school; country’s GDP per capita, country fixed effects, year fixed effects; and imputation 
dummies.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.    
Table 8:  Further results:  Other subjects and joint authority  
Subject:  Reading  Science  Math 
Measurement of autonomy:  Full autonomy  Joint authority 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Academic-content autonomy  -12.938  -28.529
**  -26.070
* 
  (8.928)  (11.484)  (13.152) 




  (0.557)  (0.505)  (0.627) 
R
2   0.351  0.337  0.384 
Personnel autonomy   -6.929  -12.430  0.709 
  (14.018)  (10.810)  (13.838) 
Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita  3.098
***  0.550  1.335 
  (1.066)  (0.853)  (0.921) 
R
2   0.351  0.336  0.384 
Students  1,125,794  1,042,791  1,042,995 
Countries   42  42  42 
Countries-by-waves  154  155  155 
Notes:  Each panel-by-column presents results of a separate regression.  Dependent variable:  PISA test score in respective subject.  Least squares regression 
weighted by students’ sampling probability, including country (and year) fixed effects.  School autonomy measured as country average.  Initial GDP per capita is 
centered at $8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000.  
Sample: student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.  Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental 
education, books at home, immigration status, language spoken at home; school location, school size, share of fully certified teachers at school, shortage of math 
teachers, private vs. public school management, share of government funding at school; country’s GDP per capita, country fixed effects, year fixed effects; and 
imputation dummies.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 
percent.    
Table 9:  Extended model:  Including central exit exams 
  (1)  (2) 
Academic-content autonomy  -48.511
**  -48.645
** 
  (19.363)  (19.921) 
Academic-content autonomy x Central exit exams (CEE)  32.750
**  32.931
* 
  (14.374)  (16.382) 
Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP per capita  3.141
***  3.168
*** 
  (0.563)  (0.938) 
Academic-content autonomy x CEE x Initial GDP per capita    -0.042 
    (1.161) 
R
2   0.380  0.380 
Personnel autonomy  -28.555
*  -19.300 
  (14.574)  (17.994) 
Personnel autonomy x Central exit exams (CEE)  18.310  5.755 
  (21.815)  (27.312) 
Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita  3.446
***  0.897 
  (1.057)  (2.149) 
Personnel autonomy x CEE x Initial GDP per capita    3.493 
    (2.545) 
R
2   0.379  0.379 
Notes:  Each panel-by-column presents results of a separate regression.  Dependent variable:  PISA math test score.  Least squares regression weighted by 
students’ sampling probability, including country (and year) fixed effects.  School autonomy measured as country average.  Initial GDP per capita is centered at 
$8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000.  Sample: 
student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.  Sample size in each specification: 1,031,652 students, 41 countries, 152 country-by-wave 
observations.  Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, language spoken at 
home;  school location, school size, share of  fully certified teachers at school, shortage of  math teachers, private vs. public school  management, share of 
government funding at school; country’s GDP per capita, country fixed effects, year fixed effects; and imputation dummies.  Robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.    
Table 10:  Alternative measure of development level:  Initial level of student achievement  
Measure of initial achievement:  Average PISA score    Dummy for average PISA score above  
        400 points  500 points 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Academic-content autonomy  -63.257
***  -60.480
***    -85.567
***  -32.530
** 
  (14.544)  (13.773)    (19.203)  (14.818) 
Academic-content autonomy x Initial achievement   0.744
***  0.601
***    74.590
***  73.258
*** 
  (0.076)  (0.089)    (16.739)  (12.443) 
Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP per capita    1.193
**       
    (0.535)       
R
2   0.386  0.386    0.385  0.385 
Personnel autonomy   -32.691
*  -29.342    -51.538  -14.953 
  (17.660)  (18.356)    (31.462)  (12.657) 
Personnel autonomy x Initial achievement  0.654
***  0.372    63.266
*  82.534
*** 
  (0.216)  (0.292)    (32.166)  (24.584) 
Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita    1.991       
    (1.406)       
R
2   0.384  0.384    0.384  0.384 
Notes:  Each panel-by-column presents results of a separate regression.  Dependent variable:  PISA math test score.  Least squares regression weighted by 
students’ sampling probability, including country (and year) fixed effects.  School autonomy measured as country average.  In the first two columns, the initial 
average PISA score is centered at 400 (one standard deviation below the OECD mean), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a 
country that in 2000 performed at a level one standard deviation below the OECD mean.  Sample: student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, 
and 2009.  Sample size in each specification: 1,042,995 students, 42 countries, 155 country-by-wave observations.  Control variables include: student gender, 
age, parental occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, language spoken at home; school location, school size, share of fully certified 
teachers at school, shortage of math teachers, private vs. public school management, share of government funding at school; country’s GDP per capita, country 
fixed effects, year fixed effects; and imputation dummies.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses.  Significance level: 
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent, 
* 10 percent.  